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RECENr DEVELOPMENTS IN EXTRADmON
INTERSTATE CO-OPERATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EXTRADmON LAW: CAN THE TWO EXIST?*

by
Sharon A•. Williams••

1.

Introduction

Extradition may be defined as the complex compendium of rules and procedures
that enable states to seek the return of fugitives from their criminal justice systems. In this sense extradition is a pan of the system of mutual assistance in
criminal matters between states. The essential element here is reciprocity, with
states having a mutuality of obligations. 1 However, at the same time, extradition
performs the important function of providing the individual fugitive with protection through legal safeguards, that may prevent return to the state making the
extradition request.
Initially, the emphasis of extradition law was on the obligations owed by one
state to anoth.e r state and the fugitive under consideration had only the rights and
procedural safeguards granted to her or him as an object of the process. The sole
recourse that the fugitive had was to the extradition treaty and the domestic law
of the requested state. It is evident that here there were potentially two conflicting
pulls in opposite directions: the international co-operative approach, bearing on
the rights and duties of states and the domestic law perspective with an increasing
emphasis on the protection of a fugitive's rights.
Case law in many states including Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States shows a favour for liberal interpretation of treaties in order to give
effect to them. This bas been viewed as in keeping with the commitment to interpret them in good faith, as dictated by the maxim pacta sunt servanda. In a 1987
decision of the Supreme Coun of Canada in Canada v. Schmidt, it was held
that2 :
"The prcscm syslcm of extradition works bce<1usc couru give the treaties a fair and
liberal interpretation with a view 10 fulfilling Canada's obligations, reducing the

•

Paper prcsenced at the Conference Commemorating lhe 701h Anniversary of lhe AAA held at
The Hague, 19·21 July 1993.

••

F.R.S.C .. LL.B .. LL.M .. D.Jur.. Professor of lntc:mationaJ Law and International Criminal
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As1orcciprocityseeM.C. Bassiouni , lntcmationalExtradition: United Slates lawand Practice,
Vol. I (2nd ed .. 1987), p. 325 and International Extradition and World Public Order (1974).
pp. 314-315.
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tcchnicalilies of criminal law to a minimum and uusting the courts in the foreign
country to give the fugitive a fair trial."
In Belgium v. Pos1le1hwai1e3. the House of Lords reasoned in 1988 that states
have entered into extradition treaties in order to bring to justice those who have
committed grave crimes and that to apply to th.em strict canons of statutory interpretation appropriate to construing domestic legislation would tend to defeat
rather than serve the purpose.
The purpose of this aniclc is to address in general terms whether the traditional safeguards for the fugitive arc either needed or warranted today given
the increased injection of international human rights law into the process, as well
as increasing reliance on constitutional norms in some stares. The argument is
that in an age of increased co-operation in international criminal matters, with
a determined cffon being made by many states to deter and if thls fails to extradite or prosecute international and transnational criminal offenders, obstacles that
arc concerned with essentially conceptions of state sovereignly can be done away
with as long as basic human rights and fundamental freedoms arc guaranteed.
This anicle will consider two of lhc grounds for refusal and consider their
future place in extradition law and practice. The experience of Canada, a state
that does not belong to a cohesive regional system, such as the CouOOJ of Europe,
with strong transnational human rights protections and close international criminal
co-operation will be the focus. Unlike the siruation in states panics to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Frccdoms4 , any transgression by Canada of internationally recognized human rights cannot be appealed
to a regional adjudicative body with enforcement powers such as the European
Coun of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Nevenheless, it must be noted that the
1982 Canadian Constitution Act5 is modelled in many respects on the European
Convention on Human Rights, as well as the lntcrnational Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 6
2.

Grounds for refusal

2.1.

Nationality of the fugitive

Broadly speaking. when a state enters into an extradition treaiy relationship with
another state based on rcciproci1y, it seems to imply an understanding that the
panics view as more or less equivalent their respective conceptions of the fundamentals of criminal justice. On this basis. is it in keeping with this perceived

3.

(1987), A.C. 924. This case wucitcd by the Judicial Commlttccoflhc Privy Council in United
Sraus v. Bowt! (1990). A.C. SOO (On appeal from Bahamas).

4.
S.

19SO ETS No. S.

Pan I of the 1982 Const.itution Act.

6.

999 UNTS, p. 171.
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mutual confidence and respect, for the requested state to refuse to extradite ilS
own citizens and nationals, on th.e one hand, but to be amenable to surrender noncitizcn permanent residenlS or other aliens on the other? If the criminal law safeguards al trial and other guarantees for the fair trial of the fugitive, once extradited arc more or less equivalent in both states, then should not extradition of
all offenders be viewed in the same way and permitted?
Space does not permit an account of the history of this ex.ception to extradition in civil law countries and the contrary position taken by common law jurisdictions. However, a few brief remarks arc necessary, on what Lord Cockburn
in 1877 called a ~blot on the law". 7 A year later in 1878 be chaired a royal commission in Great Britain 10 look at the state of extradition law. Four traditional
arguments were identified for non~xtradition of nationals. Firstly, the fugitive
should not be withdrawn from bis natural judges. Secondly, the state owes to
its subjects the protection of its laws. Thirdly, it is not possible to have complete
confidence in the justice meted out in a foreign state, especially with regard 10
a foreigner and founhly, it is not advantageous to the accused to be tried in a
foreign language, separated from family, friends, resources and character
witnesses. 8
II must be recalled that if the common law countries that at that time and
still today use the territorial basis of jurisdiction over the offence as their primary basis were to refuse extradition of citizens, alleged and convicted fugitive
offenders would avoid prosecution or punishment. The common law approach
has thus been that where an extradition treaty is silent as to nationality or citizenship it applies to all persons. The British courts, like the Cockburn Commission
have refused to accept the view that the non~tradition of citizcns or nationals
is a rule of customary international law and should be implied into the extradition
treaty.
The majority of Canada's extradition treaties that specify nationality or citizenship state that the parties arc not obliged to extradite such persons, giving a
discretion to the requested state.9 Of special interest here is the 1989 Treaty
between Canada and the Netherlands that talces a different tack and perhaps is
indicative of future developments on th.is issue. Article 3(1) provides that a request for extradition "shall not be refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought" . 10 In those treaties where a discretion is present, from
the Canadian perspective it is a policy maner for the executive, namely, the
Minister of Justice. This is also the case with the political offence exception11

7.

R. v. Wilson , 11877] 3 Q. B. 42. 44.

8.

Royal Commission on Exrraditlon. Repon or the Commissioners (1878), Cmd . 2039, 908.

9.

Sec, ~.g.. Eli1radition Treaty between Caiuda and Mexico, Can. T.S. 1990, No. 35, Anlcle
3(1); Exr.nditioo Treaty between Canada and France. Can. T .S . 1989, No. 38, Ankle 3(1 ).

10. Extradition Treaty between Camda and the Netherlands, Can. T.S. No. 32, Ankle 3(1 ).
11. Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-23, s. 22. Sec Wisconsin v. Armstrong, (1973) 30 D.l..R.
3d 727.
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and the death scnrence exception. 12 It should, however, be sttcssed that should the

treaty obligation, the section of the EJttradition Act or the exercise of the
Minister's discretion violate a right of the fugitive contained in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is an integral part of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 13, then the provisions of the Charter of Rights will have
primacy. As was stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. SchmidJ 14
"There can be no doubt that the actions undertaken by the Government of Canada
in extradition as in other maners arc subject to scrutiny under the Charter ... •
On the other hand, many civil law stateS have been uncompromising on this
issue. Apart from the reasons outlined in the Cockburn Commission, the only
rationale for non-extradition is that any detrimental impact is tempered by the
domestic provision for prosecution on the nationality basis of jurisdiction over
the criminal offence. It is submitted that if the requesting state cannot be trusted
to act fairly, then no extradition shou.ld take place regardless of nationality. On
this point it has been stated that 15
"(l)f a state owes to its nationals a duiy to apply its own laws 10 them as to acts,
wherever committed by them. then it should demand extradition of nationals who
have committed acts abroad and have been taken into cus1ody there. In facl, in the
latter siruacion, the stale of allegiance contents itself with watching 10 sec tha.t its
nationals obtain justice. The same protection of nationals should suffice after
extradition."

Even where the requested state docs have the jurisdiction to prosecute itself based
on nationality, the accused is in a privileged position, because the stale of nationality may have no real interest in prosecuting for an offence committed abroad,
where the victims likely are foreigners. with remote sources of evidence and also
a general lack of contact with the crime. l6
In Canada, until the enacunent in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. Canadian citizens had been extradited either where the extradition
treaty was silent on the nationality question or where a d.iscretion existed and
was exercised by the Minister of Justice in favour of extradition. Section 6( I)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that every Canadian
citizen has the right "to enter, remain in and leave Canada". In this context the
issue is what is meant by the word "remain". Without going into the intricacies

12. Extradition Act. id.• s. 1S. Sec funher Sharon A. Williams, Extradition 10 a Sttlc tha1 lmposcs
Ille Oealh Penalty. 2 CY!L 1990. pp. 117. 138-141.
13. Op. cit. supra n. S.

14. Op. cit. supra n. 2. p. SIS ~r l:l Forest J.). referring 10 Opuation DisntlUllle Inc. v. R..
(198S) I S.C.R. 441, 4SS , 464.
IS. Oran Convention on Extradition wilh Commcn1. 29 Al!L 1935, pp. IS. 128.

16. See S .A. WilJW!u. Human Rights Safeguards and tn1cma1ional Co-oper:uion in Bxtndi1ion:
S1riking Ille Balance. 3 Criminal Law Forum 1m, pp. 191. 203.
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of the Canadian Chancr and especially the limiting Section I, it is sufficient here
to look to the cases on point which go to the hean of the matter.
In Federal Republic of Gennany v. Rauca 11 , Helmut Rauea was charged
in the Federal Republic of Gennany with mass murder in Lithuania during the
Second World War, during its occupation and de/aero control by Germany. At
the time be was a German citizen and member of the Gestapo. rn the 1950s be
had gained entrance to Canada and ev·entually had become a Canadian citizen.
When this request was presented Canada had not enacted the amendments to its
Criminal Code that have been in place since August I 987 which would allow
for prosecution in Canada of such a case, on the basis here of the presence of
the accused today in Canada, even though it is the onJy connecting element. It
was argued on the fugitive's behalf that onJy extradition should be ru.led out
because of the right of the Canadian citizen to remain in Canada. II was held that
even though the right to remain is prima facie violated by extradition, the right
to remain is not absolute and extradition is •a reasonable limit prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society~. Two more
recent cases have presented a Section 6( I) right to remain argument, but with
the vital fact difference that rather than be extradited they could in fact in theory
have been prosecuted in Canada for the sam.e criminal conduct because aa significant portion of the activities took place in Canada" . 18 Their argument was
based on the facts that their personal conduct had occurred entirely in Canada
and that the.re was concurrent jurisdiction in Canada and the United States. In
dea.ling with this contention that because prosecucion was possible that extradition
was unconstitutional in the cases of United States v. Cotronit 9 and United States
v. El 7.ein2° the Supreme Coun of Canada held that extradition was essential
to the continuance of a stable and democratic society and that the objectives of
extradition warranted the limited interference with the right to remain in Canada.
Specifically, the Supreme Coun stated that in a number of cases Canada had
recognized that the United States as the requesting state had jurisdiction over the
offence and the ability to request extradition from Canada successfully where
the fugitive's acts were confined to Canadian territory, but detrimenta.I effeccs
were felt in the United States. 2 t Also, the Coun held that it may in some cases
be preferable for the accused to be tried in the foreign state. 22 Such a decision
must be based on the prosecutorial discretion of the requested state, whilst giving
due regard to individual constitutional rights. ln Canada, as in many countries,
prosecutorial d.iscretion bas been viewed as both necessary and desirable and the
courts have been reluctant to review such a power. The key seems to have been

17. (1983). 41 O.R. (2d). 225 (Ont . C.A.).
18. The ICSI laid OUI in Ubman v. R.. [198S] 2 S .C.R. 178, 212 (S.C.C.).
19. (19891 1 S.C.R. 1469 (S.C.C.).

20. Id.
21. Id.. 1488.
22. Id.
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that the criminal justice system best operates through a broad grant of prosccutorial discretion and that there may be very valid reasons why the decision is
made to extradite rather than to prosecute. Unless there is an abuse of process,
in that the discretion were exercised in an improper or arbitrary way23 , the decision should not be interfered with by the couns. The prosccutorial authorities
have the obligation to make sure that prosecution in Canada is not a realistic
option.24
ln conclusion, Canadian courts view extradition, even where prosecution
in Canada is possible on the same facts as a reasonable limitation on the right
of a Canadian to remain in Canada, especially where the objective is the effective prosecution of international ,:rime. Thus, it bas been possible to reconcile
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Canada's extradition treaty
obligations.
2.2.

The double criminality rule

It is a basic precept of extradition law, contained in many states' domestic legislation as well as bilateral extradition treaties, that the double criminality rule bas
a central role to play. The rule provides that the offence for which the fugitive
is sought must, on the basis of reciprocity, be one for which the requested stare
could in tum rcqucsr extradition. It relates to the maxim nu/la poena sine lege,
or no punishment without law. As Oppenheim succinctly stated: •No person may
be extradited whose deed is not a crime according to the criminal law of the swe
which is asked to extradite as well as the state which demands extradition. "15
Nevertheless, it is not viewed as a principle of customary international law, but
rather as a creature of treaty and statute. 2AI Thus, the fugitive cannot raise it
as a ground for refusal if it is not provided for in the governing treaty . This
position bas recent!~ been reinforced by the Supreme Coun of Canada in United
States v. McVey II 7 , where it was held that there is no obligation under customary international law or the common law; that treaties create the obligation
to do so and that the parameters of the obligations must be found within the four
comers of the treaties. As noted in another decision of the same court in Allard
v. Chare11e28, the practice of states may have a value in inte.rprcting the law

23. Sec R. v. &Jut. 119881 2 S.C.R. 387. 411 (S.C.C.). Nocc Unittd Starts v. laquinto, No.
3S6/91 (Ont. C.A•. 23 July 1991, unreponcd).

24. Id•• 1498.
2.5. L. Oppenheim. International Law (8th ed •• 195.S). p. 701 .
26. Sec Factor v. Loubtnhtlmer. 290 US, 276 (1923).
27. 119921 3 S.C.R. 4S7. Hereinafter "McVey //".
28 . (19911 I S.C.R 861, 86.S. Sec also R. v. Parisitn, 1198811 S.C.R. 950. Note the contrary
position taken by I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (1971), p. 138. However. this
does not seem w gel with acrual practice.
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but when it comes down to extradition it is the terms of the treaty that must be
looked at and that is where the international duty lies.
The approach ta.ken by Canada over the last five years or so bas been to
adopt lhe so-called "no-list" approach in new or amended extradition treatics.29
This means that there is not a list of extraditable crimes appended to the panicular
treaty and the emphasis is on double criminality and duality of punishability. 30
This appears to be the way of the future, as it prevents the problems of out-dated
lists and allows for potentially more offences to be extraditable such as fiscal
offences, that for the most part are not extraditable under list trcaties. 31 Nevertheless, it is still the requirement, and in these no-list treaties perforce the central
requirement, that the offence is regarded as criminal in both the requesting and
requested states. The emphasis is not on the strict denomination of the offence
in the respective states but rather upon the conduct constituting the offence.
However. in those treaties which still maintain the appended list of extraditable offences, the position bas long been taken by Canadian courts that it is not
necessary for Canada and the requesting state to use the same terminology or
denomination. The key factor bas been that the fugitive bas committed what
amounts to a criminal offence in both states and that a prima facit case bas been
established. In Co1roni v. Attorney Gtntral of Camida32 , the Supreme Coun
of Canada held that the test to be used is what is the essence of the offence.
There is no requirement of exact identity between the offence that the fugitive
is charged with in the requesting state and the Canadian offence. The emphasis
is on the criminal conduct, the inquiry is not focussed on the legal framework
of the requesting state, but rather on the facts and whether they can be fitted into
Canadian criminal law in order to establish that if the conduct had occurred in
Canada. it would have amou.nted to a criminal offence in that country.
The issue of double criminaliir came before the Supreme Coun of Canada
again in Washington v. Johnson3 , where the applicable treaty was the 1971

29. Stt, t .g .. lhe Exindilion TrC2ties betWttn Caiuda and Franu, Can. T .S . t989, No. 36;
Can.Mia and lhe Nclhcrlands. Can. T .S. t99t. No. 32: Canada and India. Can. T .S . 1987. No.
14 and Canada and lhc United Sta~ of America. Can. T.S. 1976. No. 3. as amended by
Protocol. Can. T .S. 1991. No. 37.
30. Bassiouni. op. cit. supra n. I. p. 322. Note !hat there bu been a considerable debate over the
ycan u to the two potential ways to interpret double criminality. There is the in con.crtto, or
objective approach that loolr.s to tbc euct labelling of the offence and its constitucnl clements.
See 41 RIDP 1970, p. 12 for resolutions adopccd by the 1969 Congress of tbe Jruemational
Assoclarion of Penal Law, which demonslr.ltcs a preference for this approach. On the other
band there is the in obstrocto, or subjective approach that looks to the acrual criminal nature
of the act without und.uc ""'ight on the label and full identity of the elements in the states. See
C. van den Winaacn. Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdicrion, in: N. Jareborg
(ed .). Double Criminality Studies in lntemarional Law (1989), p. 43.
31. Note, however. that the Cllccption for fiical offences even In list treaties was eroded in the
House of Lords decision in R. v. Oiltf Mtrropollton Mag/strait, u pone Stcrttory of Stole
for the Home /)qHutmmt, (19881 I WLR 1204 (H.L.).
32. (197611 S .C .R. 219. Sec :Wo Unlrtd Stotts v. Smith. (1984) 15 C.C.C. 3d 16.
33. 11988140

c.c.c. 3d 548.
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Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States.34 This treaty contained a schedule of offences. In writing for the majority Justice Wilson stated
that the issue was whether the requesting state must establish that the offence
charged in the requesting state is an offencc in Canada, or whether it was enough
to show that the conduct that the fugitive was charged with would have amounted
to a crime, I.isled in the treaty, if it had taken place in Canada. As in the earli.e r
cases the coun held that there is no need for exact identity in terminology used
10 denominate the offence, nor for the elements of the crime to be the same in
both states. 3s As a practical matter this would be an impossible task to accomplish, even as in this case in two common law systems with fairly similar criminal
systems.36 Most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in McVey 1137 , presented the Canadian approach, when the majority noted that in Canada the practice
had developed of giving th.e extradition judge the role of identifying the crime
for which the fugitive was charged according to Canadian law. The.refore, the
crime as it is known in the requesting state is set out in the information and the
arrest warrant and the extradition judge identifies the equivalent Canadian crime.
This being said, there was until the Supreme Court decision in McVey n 38
some controversy in Canadian jurisprudence as 10 whether the crime had to be
listed in the schedule or list appended to the treaty in the names under which it
is known in the requesting state and Canada. lo simple terms was a double listing
necessary? This restrictive approach was taken bl'oJustice Borins in United States
v. Smith39 , and by Justice Wilson in Johnson. Both relied on the following
passage from La Forest's Extradition to and from Canada41 :
•An ciuradition crime may be broadly defined as an act of which a person is accused.
or has been convicted of having committed within the jurisdiction of one state. that
constitutes a crime in that state and in the state where that person is found, and that
is mentioned or described in an extradition treaty between those states under a name
or description by which it is known in each state."
An opposite view was taken by Justice Smith, the extradition judge in Unitt!d StaJes
v. Caro-Payan42 and UniJt!d StaJes v. Golirsdiek.43 She emphasiud that "a treaty

34. Entered into force in 1976. Can. T.S. 1976. No. 3; 27 U.S.T . • p. 983.
3S. Op. cit. supra n. 34. p. SS3.

36. See H.V.E. Hanley Booth. British Extradition Law and Procedure (1980). p. SO. where he
states that !be extradition court cannot become • tribunal of foreign law.
37. Op. cit. supra n. 2, at p. Sl2.
38. Id.
39. Op. rit. supra n. 32. at p. 28.
40. Op. cit. supra n.

33.

41. G.V. La f-orcst. Extradition to and from Canada (2nd ed .. 1977), p. 42.

42. Ont. D.C.• 18 February 1988. unreported.
43. Ont . D.C.• Janu.iry 1986. unreported .
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must be [given] a liberal interpretation m working to achieve its stated ends~ .44
She applied the British cases of In re Neilson.u and United States v. McCaffery"6
and went on to hold that the old double criminality test, which required an almost
exact pairing of all of the constituent c·lements, is not the requisite test today.
Rather, it is the conduc1 test tha1 should be applied. The Caro-Payan decision
with respect to there being no need for an exact pairing of the constituent elements
is non-controversial. However, it is the underlying rationale of th.e decision that
is pe.rtinent to this discussion, in that Justice Smith seems to have had the opinion
that as long as the conduct would be criminal if committed in Canada, and if that
conduct is listed in the treaty, then there is no need for it also to be listed under
a name by which it is known in the requesting state. This would seem to go
against the position taken in the La Forest text, that there would have to be a
double listing in the treaty schedule. As this writer has commented elsewhere.
however much assistance a doctrinal view may be it does not bind the courts. 47
There is a good argument that Article 2(1) of the 1971 Canada-United States
Extradition Treaty does not require such double listing. The McVey II case has
cleared up this quandary as to single or double listing. This case involved an
extradition reques1 for the offence of conspiracy to export high-technology equipment to the former USSR and ten counts of malcing false statements to the United
States Customs service to put such export into effect. The 1971 Treaty did not
list the making of false statements as an extraditable offence. However, the extradition judge held that he could commit the fugitive for surrender because firstly,
the conduct of the fugitive would have constituted the crime of forgery if done
in Canada48 • and secondly because forgery was listed in the 1971 Treaty. It
must be not.ed that McVey's conduct did not amount to forgery in the United
States. The argument presented by the fugitive that a double listing was required
was rejected. This decision was reversed on habeas corpus and upheld on appeal
to the British Columbia Court of Appea149 , where the Court interpreted the
Johnson case to require double listing. The passage in the La Forest text quoted
above was referred to again.
None of the earlier cases had direct bearing factually on the Mc Vey Tl case.
The Smith case had dealt with a request for murder where the conduct would have
been c.lassified as manslaughter in Canada. However, both offences were listed
in the 1971 Canada-United States Treaty. In Johnson, the concern of the Supreme
Court of Canada was with whether the crime for which the fugitive was sought
would be a crime contained in the treaty list by a name known under the criminal
44. Caro-Payan, op. cit. supra n. 42.

4S. [19841 2 All E.R . 84 (H .L.).
46. (19841 2 AU E.R . 570 (H .L.).

47. S.A. Williams, The Double Criminality Ruic and Extradition: A Comparative Analysis, IS
Nova LR 1991. pp. 82, 608 and S.A. Williams. The Double Criminality Ruic Revisited. 27
Israel LR 1993, pp. I. 7.
48. Sec the Criminal Code of Canada. R.S.C . 1985 c. C.46. ss . 366 and 321.
49. [1989) 33 B.C.l.R. 2d 28.
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law of Canada. The difficult question is to decide what construction must be
placed upon Article 2(1) of the 1971 Treaty which provides that:

"Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this Treaty for any of
lhe offences listed in lhe Schedule annexed to this Treaty, which is an integral part
of this Treaty, provided lhat these offences are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.·
When the wording is examined carefully, ii is apparent that the article can be
divided into two parts. Firstly, the person shall be exttadited according to the
provisions of the treaty for any of the offences listed in the Schedule and secondly, that the Listed offences must be punishable by the laws of both stales by a term
of imprisonment of not less than one year. As discussed above, it is the duality
of conceptions of the criminality of the conduct that is the keynote. The intention
of the parties to the treaty was to cxttadite on the basis of reciprocity and the
second part of Anicle 2( I) should be read in this light. The term "offences"
should be interpreted to mean "conduct" and any "conduct" listed in th.e treaty
should be extraditable, provided that it meets the two part test contained therein.
The principle of speciality is also of interest here. It provides that a person
shall not be tried or punished in the re'!l:csting stale for an offence other than
that for which extradition was granted. It is linked to the rigid approach of
noo-cxttadition exhibited by the Court of Appeal in Mc Vey II. However, if a rigid
technical interpretation is made of Article 2(1) of the 1971 Treaty, it would result
i.n unnecessary difficulties concerning criminal conduct. The British Columbia
Coun of Appeal held that as McVey's conduct would not amount to forgery
under the US Code and other legislation, this would result in a violation of the
specialty principle. Sl This analysis seems artificial and would defeat the purpose
of the treaty, which is based on the reciprocal recognition by both states of the
criminality of the conduct. Unrelated offences allegedly commined before extra
The Supreme Coun of Canada n.oted in McVey II that the Coun of Appeal
considered itself bound by the Johnson precedent, although the facts as conceded
by the laner coun were the reverse. lo Johnson the issue had been whether the
requesting state bad to establish that the crime would constitute one listed in the
schedule according to the law of Canada. The majority found that in coming t.o
its decision the Court of Appeal in McVey bad been affected by the quotation
from the La Forest text quoted above. 52 Most imponantly, Justice La Forest
writing for the majority and author of the said book noted that the definition in
a book is not a substitute for the extradition legislation, and it may be added the
treaty itself. He stated that the quoted passage was meant to be "broad description
viewed from the perspective of the whole of the extradition process~ and not to

SO. See, t.g., Ankle XJJ of the 1971 Canada· United Stites fa1radition Treaty.

SI. 11988) 30 B.C .L.R. 2d 197.
S2. Op. cit. supra n. 41.
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be used in place of the legislation itself. Therefore, he dispatched with the requirement for a double listing.
·
In conclusion, the McVey 11 Coun held that what must be established i.s that
the conduct of the fugitive would, if it had occurred in Canada constitute a crime
listed in the treaty according to some name by which it is known under Canadian
criminal law. This decision is to be applauded. Even though the 1991 Protocol53
to the 1971 Canada-United States Treaty has adopted the no-list approach and
now applies to all extradition requests berween Canada and the United States
made after its entry into force, even where the criminal conduct took place prior
to that date, the decision is of critical imponance to the interpretation of those
treaties, which are still in the majority, chat retain the list of extraditable offences.
3.

Conclusion

It is necessary to strike the appropriate balance between safeguarding the rights
of the individual and the strengthening of muruaUy beneficial internati.onal cooperation in criminal matters between states. Clearly, in the absence of effective
global international human rights enfarcement mechanisms, many of the traditional safeguards in the extradition process still have a vital role to play. In light
of the above discussion. it is submitted that the double criminality rule based on
dual conceptions of criminality of the conduct and a dual punishability requirement should be retained. However, the nationality exception should be abolished.
In so doing international co-operation and individual human rights would be
provided for.
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